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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 12-3668
_____________
ALEX EDMOND ERIC SMITH,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent
_______________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
United States Department of Justice
Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA No. A036-799-753)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Walter A. Durling
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 28, 2013
Before: FISHER, JORDAN and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: November 5, 2013)
_______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________
JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
Alex Smith petitions for review of an August 23, 2012 decision of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) determination that

he is removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). For the reasons that follow, we will
deny the petition.
I.

Background
Smith is a native and citizen of Antigua and Barbuda and has been a lawful

permanent resident of the United States since he immigrated to this country in 1981. On
March 31, 2010, he pled guilty in Pennsylvania state court to one violation of 35 Pa. Stat.
§ 780-113(a)(30), which criminalizes “the manufacture, delivery, or possession with
intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance.” Based on that conviction, the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) charged Smith with removability due to the
commission of an “aggravated felony” under the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”).1 As evidence of Smith’s removability, DHS submitted to the IJ a copy of his
written guilty plea, in which he had agreed “to allow the Judge to incorporate … into the
record” the factual allegations “from the Affidavit of Probable Cause,” instead of having
the Assistant District Attorney summarize the facts on which his guilty plea was based.
(A.R. at 106.) The Affidavit of Probable Cause revealed that Smith had conspired with
his brother to buy 75 pounds of marijuana for $52,500.
Based on that evidence, the IJ concluded that Smith had been convicted of an
aggravated felony under the INA and was therefore subject to deportation. Smith
appealed to the BIA, which affirmed the IJ’s decision. This timely petition followed.

1

The INA provides that “[a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at
any time after admission is deportable.” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
2

II.

Discussion2
Smith argues that the BIA and IJ erroneously concluded that his 2010 conviction

constitutes an “aggravated felony” under the INA. Although he concedes that “the
Affidavit of Probable Cause contains information sufficient to base a determination that
the conviction was an Aggravated Felony” (Petitioner’s Opening Br. at 4 n.3), he says
that it was improper for the IJ to rely on the Affidavit in reaching its conclusion, and that,
absent the Affidavit, the record is insufficient to show that he committed an aggravated
felony.
The INA defines “aggravated felony,” in relevant part, as “illicit trafficking in a
controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21), including a drug trafficking
crime (as defined in section 924(c) of Title 18).” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). Section
924(c) in turn defines “drug trafficking crime” as “any felony punishable under the
Controlled Substances Act.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2). A state drug conviction constitutes
an aggravated felony if “(a) it would be punishable as a felony under the federal
Controlled Substances Act, or (b) it is a felony under state law and includes an illicit
trafficking element.” Evanson v. Att’y Gen., 550 F.3d 284, 288 (3d Cir. 2008).
Accordingly, we have identified “two routes by which an offense may qualify as an
aggravated felony.” Jeune v. Att’y Gen., 476 F.3d 199, 201 (3d Cir. 2007). Under the
“illicit trafficking route,” “the state conviction is an aggravated felony if it is a felony
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We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) and “determine de novo
whether [Smith’s] conviction constituted an aggravated felony.” See Evanson v. Att’y
Gen., 550 F.3d 284, 288 (3d Cir. 2008).
3

under state law and contains a ‘trafficking element.’” Id. (quoting Gerbier v. Holmes,
280 F.3d 297, 313 (3d Cir. 2002)). The second route – termed the “hypothetical federal
felony route” – requires that “we compare the offense of conviction to the federal
Controlled Substances Act to determine if it is analogous to an offense under that Act.”
Evanson, 550 F.3d at 289.
Under either route, “we presumptively apply the ‘formal categorical approach’”
when making “aggravated felony” determinations, which requires that we “look only to
the statutory definitions of the prior offenses.” Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 462 F.3d 287, 291
(3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144, 147-48 (3d Cir. 2004)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). In other words, when comparing an offense to a hypothetical
federal felony or determining whether it contains a trafficking element, we generally
consider only the elements of the relevant statute. We may depart from the formal
categorical approach, however, when the statute of conviction “is phrased in the
disjunctive such that it is unclear from the face of the statute whether the conviction was
an aggravated felony.” Jeune, 476 F.3d at 202. In such an instance, we can apply the
“modified categorical approach,” which allows us to look beyond the statutory definition
for the limited purpose “of determining the elements necessarily found by a jury, or
admitted by a defendant in pleading guilty.” Evanson, 550 F.3d at 290 & n.4.
As we have explained previously, a conviction under 35 Pa. Stat. § 780-113(a)(30)
– the statute of conviction involved here – is not necessarily an aggravated felony under
either the hypothetical federal felony approach or the illicit trafficking element approach.
See Evanson, 550 F.3d at 290. Under that Pennsylvania statute, which broadly
4

criminalizes “the manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or
deliver, a controlled substance,” 35 Pa. Stat. § 780-113(a)(30), a person could be
prosecuted for “distributing a small amount of marijuana for no remuneration,” which
would not be equivalent to a federal drug felony, Catwell v. Att’y Gen., 623 F.3d 199, 207
(3d Cir. 2010), or for manufacturing drugs for personal use, which would not involve a
trafficking element, Garcia, 462 F.3d at 293 n.9. But the statute is “disjunctive,” in that
it “describes three distinct offenses: manufacture, delivery, and possession with the intent
to deliver or manufacture.” Id. at 293 & n.9. We are therefore not limited to considering
just Smith’s statute of conviction, but can apply the modified categorical approach to
determine whether he was convicted of an aggravated felony. Evanson, 550 F.3d at 29192.3
Even under the modified categorical approach, however, we can only look beyond
the statutory definition to a limited extent and for a limited purpose. We are allowed “to
determine what elements formed the basis for a defendant’s underlying conviction” by
consulting “the charging document and jury instructions.”4 Id. at 291. When a defendant

3

In Evanson, we applied the modified categorical approach with regard to the
illicit trafficking element approach, and we expressed uncertainty as to whether “the
Pennsylvania statute is disjunctive in a sense that is relevant to the inquiry under the
hypothetical federal felony test.” 550 F.3d at 292 n.5. We subsequently resolved that
uncertainty by holding, in a case involving the hypothetical federal felony test, that,
because the Pennsylvania statute is divisible, “this Court will apply the modified
categorical approach.” Catwell, 623 F.3d at 207.
4

Although the Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990),
defined the categorical approach in the context of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18
U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), we apply the same approach “in evaluating whether predicate
5

has pled guilty to the underlying offense, as Smith did, the Supreme Court’s decision in
Shepard v. United States permits us to examine the “statutory definition, charging
document, written plea agreement, transcript of the plea colloquy, and any explicit factual
finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented,” with our focus directed at the
elements upon which the plea necessarily rested. Id. (quoting Shepard v. United States,
544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Given that standard, Smith acknowledges that the IJ and the BIA could properly
consider his written guilty plea, as it is one of the documents expressly mentioned in
Shepard. See 544 U.S. at 16. Furthermore, he does not contest that, if the Affidavit of
Probable Cause had been properly incorporated into the written guilty plea, it could also
be considered, as it would thus have become part of the Shepard documents. Cf. Parrilla
v. Gonzalez, 414 F.3d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Although police reports and
complaint applications, standing alone, may not be used to enhance a sentence following
a criminal conviction, the contents of these documents may be considered if specifically
incorporated into the guilty plea or admitted by a defendant.” (citations omitted)).
Smith’s only argument against the use of the Affidavit is that, although the guilty plea
gave the judge permission to incorporate the Affidavit into the plea, it is unclear from the
record whether the Affidavit was actually incorporated. Because of that alleged
ambiguity, Smith says that the IJ and BIA were barred from considering the Affidavit, as

convictions fall within the definition of ‘aggravated felony’” in the INA. Evanson, 550
F.3d at 291.
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it is precisely the type of document the Shepard Court placed off-limits under the
modified categorical approach.
But Smith cannot wish away the record so easily. His guilty plea specifically
stated the following: “Your plea is based on factual accusations placed in writing by the
police and sworn to before a District Justice who issued an arrest warrant for these
charges.” (A.R. at 106.) He was asked, “Are you willing to allow the Judge to
incorporate these factual accusations into the record from the Affidavit of Probable Cause
or would you prefer the Assistant District Attorney to summarize the facts on which you
plead?” (Id.) And he answered “incorporate.” (Id.) In other words, he was permitted to
participate in the framing of the record, and he unambiguously chose to have the
Affidavit of Probable Cause incorporated into his guilty plea. He expressly pled guilty to
the allegations in the Affidavit of Probable Cause. See Evanson, 550 F.3d at 290 & n.4
(explaining that the modified categorical approach allows courts to look beyond the
statutory definition for the limited purpose “of determining the elements necessarily
found by a jury, or admitted by a defendant in pleading guilty”). Under those
circumstances, it was entirely proper for the BIA and IJ to consider the Affidavit for the
limited purpose of determining whether Smith pled guilty to elements that constitute an
aggravated felony under the INA.
Even Smith acknowledges that, once the Affidavit is taken into account, his
Pennsylvania conviction is an aggravated felony, and we agree.5 Because Smith’s prior

Taking the hypothetical felony route, for example, “[a] state marijuana conviction
is … equivalent to a federal drug felony if the offense involved payment or more than a
5
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conviction was indeed an aggravated felony, the BIA correctly determined that he is
removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
III.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.

small amount of marijuana.” Catwell, 623 F.3d at 206 (quoting Evanson, 550 F.3d at
289) (internal quotation marks omitted). We require the amount of marijuana possessed
by a defendant to be sufficient to qualify as a felony under the hypothetical federal felony
test so as to satisfy 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(4), which provides that “gratuitous distribution of
an undefined small amount of marijuana without remuneration is not inherently a felony
under federal law.” Jeune, 476 F.3d at 205 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the
plea colloquy with the Affidavit reflects that Smith was convicted of possession with
intent to distribute 75 pounds – just over 34 kilograms – of marijuana. That amount is
obviously well beyond the “small amount” contemplated in § 841(b)(4) and is many
times the 120.5 grams we found large enough to constitute a felony in Catwell, 623 F.3d
at 209. Thus, viewed under the modified categorical approach, the record demonstrates
that Smith’s conviction would fall under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D), which penalizes as a
felony the possession of less than 50 kilograms of marijuana.
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